Collaborative approaches to network defense are increasingly used to predict attacks as well as to speed up their detection. For instance, with highly predictive blacklisting, one aims to forecast attack sources based on alerts contributed by multiple organizations. While collaboration helps discover groups of correlated attacks targeting similar victims, it also raises important privacy concerns.
INTRODUCTION
Filtering connections from/to hosts classified as suspicious or malicious is a defense practice commonly used to reduce the number and the impact of attacks. Due to the impossibility of performing expensive real-time computations on each connection, filtering is usually done via look-ups against periodically updated lists of suspicious hosts, aka blacklists. There are two basic approaches to building blacklists: one can either maintain a local list based on past observations, or periodically obtain lists formulated by large-scale alert repositories (e.g., DShield.org, myNetWatchman [1], DeepSight [38] ) with the most prolific attack sources. Zhang et al. [40] denote these two approaches, respectively, as local and global worst offender lists (LWOL/GWOL), highlighting how the latter misses a lot of attacks as sources may choose their targets strategically, while the former is completely reactive. Consequently, they introduce the notion of highly predictive blacklisting whereby different entities send their logs to a central authority, which, in turn, returns customized blacklists based on relevance ranking, or, as in followup work, on implicit recommendation [37] .
In general, collaborative approaches to threat mitigation, besides predictive blacklisting, are being increasingly advocated both in the public and the private sector. Efforts to promote information sharing are proliferating, e.g., with initiatives from the White House [39] , CERT [6] , RedSky Alliance [34] , Wombat [11] , and Facebook ThreatExchange [2] . However, information sharing prompts important privacy concerns, and organizations are often reluctant to participate, due not only to confidentiality reasons, but also trust, liability, and competitiveness concerns. Even sharing firewall logs could harm an organization's reputation (e.g., negligence in applying patches) or disclose sensitive information about customers or business practices [3, 8] .
This motivates the need for privacy-friendly approaches to collaborative predictive blacklisting. We aim to enhance accuracy of predictive blacklists by letting organizations collaborate with each other, while minimizing the amount of information they disclose in the process. First, however, we take a closer look at existing non privacy-preserving tools [37, 40] and notice that prior work only focused on measuring the improvement in successfully predicted attacks (i.e., true positives), but failed to account for incorrect predictions (i.e., false positives and negatives). We find that the current state-of-the-art non-private system [37] actually yields a very large number of false positives, thus achieving very low precision (0.08 in our experiments). It also incurs a lot of false negatives, which makes the overall accuracy even lower than if organizations performed prediction based on local logs only (F 1 = 0.14 vs 0.26). This highlights that access to more data does not necessarily imply better predictions, and we argue that we can improve accuracy while at the same time protecting privacy by optimizing information disclosed by collaborating organizations.
We introduce a scalable and privacy-friendly system which relies on a semi-trusted authority, or STA, acting as a coordinating entity to facilitate clustering without having access to the raw data. Specifically, the STA clusters contributors based on the similarity of their logs (without accessing these logs), and helps organizations in the same cluster to share relevant logs. Toward this goal, we investigate (i) how to cluster organizations, (ii) what should be shared among them, and (iii) how to measure the effect of collaboration on accuracy. We experiment with four clustering algorithms -agglomerative clustering, k-means, k-NN, and DBSCAN -relying on the number of common attacks as a measure of similarity, which is computed in a privacy-preserving way. Then, we experiment with privacy-friendly within-clusters sharing strategies: only disclosing the details of common attacks and/or privately discovering correlated attacks.
We present the result of a comprehensive measurement analysis based on alerts obtained from DShield.org, involving 70 organizations which report an average of 4,000 daily events over a 15-day time window -an experimental setting mirroring a reasonable realworld deployment of the techniques. (Note that experiments on other periods yield similar results). For each clustering algorithm considered, and for each log sharing strategy, we compare the performance in terms of precision, recall, and F1 measure, as well as the increase in true positives, false positives, and false negatives as a result of collaboration (i.e., comparing to a local baseline prediction). We observe that different clustering algorithms exhibit different behaviors, e.g., fluctuations are observed in the average improvement with some organizations benefiting more than others. We demonstrate that controlled data sharing helps organizations forecast attacks, compared to performing predictions locally. Sharing common attacks, and using events from previously unseen attackers that have cluster-wide correlation, maximizes the number of attacks predicted but also introduces more false positives.
Our privacy-friendly techniques markedly outperform existing algorithms for predictive blacklisting [37] in both precision and recall, demonstrating that our approach not only protects privacy and minimizes information exposure but also results in better predictions. We obtain 0.84 recall, 0.23 precision, and 0.36 F1 measure, compared to, respectively, 0.66, 0.08, 0.14 from [37] .
In summary, we make three main contributions: (1) we show that what was considered the state-of-the art (non-private) system for highly predictive blacklisting achieves very low accuracy (Section 4); (2) we investigate how to measure the effect of collaboration on prediction and propose a novel privacy-friendly system for collaborative predictive blacklisting which performs even better than the non-private one (Section 5); (3) we show how to optimize the overhead incurred by the privacy protection layer using scalable cryptographic protocols (Section 6).
RELATED WORK

Collaborative Intrusion Detection
Katti et al. [22] are among the first to measure correlated attacks -i.e., attacks mounted by the same sources against different networks -establishing that they are very common yet highly targeted. They show that attack correlation persists over time and suggest that real-time collaboration between victims could significantly improve malicious IP detection time. In [40] , Zhang et al. introduce highly predictive blacklisting, having different organizations contribute alerts to a central repository such as DShield.org, which in turn provides them with daily personalized (predictive) blacklists. The prediction uses a relevance ranking scheme similar to PageRank, measuring the correlation of an attacker to a contributor based on their history as well as the attacker's recent log production patterns. Then, Soldo et al. [37] improve on [40] using an implicit recommendation system to discover similar victims as well as groups of correlated victims and attackers. In their model, the presence of attacks performed by the same source around the same time leads to stronger similarity among victims, and a neighborhood model (k-NN) is applied to clusters similar victims. Cross Association (CA) co-clustering [7] is then used to discover groups of correlated attackers and victims, and prediction within the cluster is done via a time-series algorithm -Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) -capturing attacks' temporal trends.
Meng et al [28] present a comprehensive survey highlighting the essential components, and the challenges, of collaborative security. The survey analyzes three key factors of collaborative intrusion detection, namely, communication, robustness, and privacy, arguing besides efficient and scalable communication, mechanisms for robustness (i.e., resilience to insider attacks) and privacy should be carefully considered.
Felegyhazi et al. [15] perform proactive prediction of malicious domain use: starting from a seed (e.g., confirmed bad domains), they predict clusters of related domains based on name server features (zone files containing subdomains and authoritative name servers), and infer new bad domains. Then, Liu et al. [26] , based on externally observable properties of an organization's network, aim to predict breaches without the organization's cooperation. The system collects features about the organization's network (e.g., misconfigured DNS or BGP entries within a network, spam, phishing, etc.) and uses these features to train a Random Forest classifier.
Finally, Sirivianos et al. [36] propose a collaborative system that enables hosts with no email classification functionality to check whether a host is a spammer or not. Each host then assesses the trustworthiness of spam reporters by auditing their reports and leveraging the social network of the reporters' administrators. Whereas, Moura et al. [29] evaluate how network administrators can leverage different "bad neighborhood blacklists" (i.e., malicious hosts concentrated in certain portions of the IP address space which often correspond to poorly managed networks) generated by third-party sources to detect spam messages, and observe a significantly large intersection between third-party blacklists.
Privacy In Collaborative Intrusion Detection
In [33] , Porras and Shmatikov discuss privacy risks prompted by sharing security-related data and propose data anonymization and sanitization to address them. However, follow-up work [10, 25] demonstrates that these techniques make data less useful and anyway prone to de-anonymization. Burkhart et al. [5] introduce a few privacy-preserving protocols based on secure multiparty computation (MPC) for aggregation of network statistics.This is also explored in [4] where entities send encrypted data to a central repository that aggregates contributions. However, statistics only identify most prolific attack sources and yield global models, which, as discussed in [40] , miss a significant number of attacks and yield poor prediction performance. Nagaraja et al. [30] propose an inference algorithm, BotGrep, geared to discover botnet hosts and links in network traffics by identifying structured topologies, and partially rely on privacy-preserving algorithms, such as Private Set Intersection [13] .
Finally, Freudiger et al. [17] focus on privacy-friendly collaborative threat mitigation, but rather than building an actual system, they focus on identifying which metrics (e.g., number of common attacks, dataset similarity) could be used to privately estimate the benefits of collaboration between two organizations, showing that only sharing information about common attacks already helps.
PRELIMINARIES
Dataset
Aiming to design a meaningful empirical analysis of highly predictive blacklisting, we gather a dataset of blacklisted IP addresses from DShield.org, as done in previous work [17, 37, 40] . DShield is a collaborative firewall log correlation system to which various organizations volunteer daily alerts. Each entry in the logs consists of a pseudonymized Contributor ID (the target), the source IP address (the attacker), source and target port number, and the timestamp. An example of an entry log is illustrated in Crawling. With DShield's permission, we have been collecting daily logs using a JavaScript web crawler, gathering, on average, 10 million logs from 120,000 organizations every day. We exclude entries for invalid, non-routable, or unassigned IP addresses, and discard port numbers, then, for each IP address, we extract its /24 subnet and use /24 addresses for all experiments. Note that this does not necessarily mean that predictive blacklisting algorithms will blacklist entire /24 subnets. This is an experimental choice also made by previous work [37, 40] , as the main research goal is to compare the impact of different approaches on prediction. Moreover, blacklisting an address does not imply blocking all its traffic, but rather subject it to further scrutiny, e.g., enforcing rate limiting or only allowing outgoing packets. Dataset. To facilitate our experiments, we select a 15-day period, May 17-31, 2015 and restrict our evaluations to a reasonably-sized sample of regularly contributing organizations. We select the top-100 contributors, based on the number of unique IPs reported, that also report logs every day during the 15 days. We then plot the number of logs contributed by each of the 100 organizations during each 6-day time window between May 17-31, 2015. As illustrated in Figure 1 , most contributors (around 60) submit less than 100K logs, while fewer (around 20) submit between 100K and 500K, and only a handful of organizations contribute very large amounts of logs (above 1M). Then, we pick 70 organizations, for each time window, leaving out the top-10 and the bottom-20 contributors. We do so, like in previous work [37, 17] , to minimize bias. Our final sample dataset includes 30 million attacks, contributed by 118 different organizations over 15 days, each reporting a daily average of 600 suspicious (unique) IPs and 4,000 attack events. Important Remark: Although this setting reasonably mirrors a plausible realworld deployment of our techniques, we have also repeated all our experiments on a larger number of organizations (150) and on two more sets of DShield logs, using, respectively, 15-day periods from February and December 2015, but have not found any significant difference in the results. Therefore, we limit the discussion of our experimental results to May 17-31.
Training and Testing Sets. We use the DShield dataset both as a training set and a testing set (i.e., ground truth). Specifically, we consider a sliding window of 5 days for training and 1 day for testing, as done in [37] . Notation. We use notation O = {Oi} n i=1 to denote a group of n organizations, where each Oi holds a dataset Di of alerts, i.e., suspicious IP addresses along with the related timestamp. We aim to predict IP addresses generating attacks to each Oi in the next day, using, as the training set, both its local dataset Di, as well the set D i , with suspicious IP addresses obtained by collaborating with other organizations. As discussed above, we consider n = 70 organizations using alerts collected from DShield.
EWMA Time Series Prediction
We use Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) to perform prediction. Given a signal over time r(t), we indicate with r(t + 1) the predicted value of r(t + 1), given past observations r(t ) at time t ≤ t. The predicted signal is computed as:
where α ∈ (0, 1) is a smoothing coefficient, t = 1, . . . , t denotes the training window, and t + 1 is the time slot to be predicted. For small values of α, EWMA aggregates past information uniformly across the training window, while, with a large α, the prediction algorithm focuses more on events taking place in the recent past.
Metrics
Throughout our evaluations, we use the following metrics to evaluate the performance of the predictions. True and False Positives. For each time window and for each organization, we count True Positives (TP) as well as False Positives (FP). A TP occurs when the prediction algorithm includes an IP address in an organization's predictive blacklist that does appear in its testing set, and a FP -when it does not. False Negatives. For each time window/organization, we generate predictive whitelists, i.e., sets of IPs that are not likely to attack an organization the next day, and count a False Negative (FN) when a whitelisted IP address instead appears in the testing set. TP Improvement and FP/FN Increase. We also measure the average improvement/increase in TP, FP, and FN when compared to a baseline local approach, i.e., when no collaboration occurs between organizations and each of them makes its predictions based only on its local dataset. The improvement in TP is calculated as: T Pimpr = (T Pc−T P )/T P where T Pc is the number of true positives after collaboration and TP without. Similarly, the increase in FP and FN is denoted, resp., as F Pincr = (F Pc − F P )/F P and F Nincr = (F Nc − F N )/F N . Precision, Recall and F1-Score. We calculate the True Positive Rate (TPR), aka recall, False Positive Rate (F P R), as well as Positive Predictive Value (PPV), aka precision, defined as:
T P R = T P/(T P + F N ) F P R = F P/(F P + T N ) P P V = T P/(T P + F P ) and derive the F1 measure, i.e.,
The absence of an IP from our testing set can occur either when the IP is not considered suspicious or if it does not generate requests. While we cannot actually distinguish between the two cases, in the latter a FP is actually less "severe" than in the former, thus our FP count may be a bit more conservative. However, our main goal is really to measure and compare with each other the impact of different collaboration strategies on predictions so we use this method without loss of generality.
EVALUATING EXISTING PREDICTIVE BLACKLISTING APPROACHES
In this section, we present the results of an experimental evaluation of the implicit recommendation based approach proposed by Soldo et al [37] , which is considered the state-of-the-art for highly predictive blacklisting. We have re-implemented their system in Python and used Chakrabarti's implementation of Cross Association (CA) as per [7] . 1 More specifically, we evaluate [37] 's performance over our DShield dataset from Section 3.1: we start by measuring, as a baseline, the basic predictor which only relies on a local EWMA time series algorithm (TS), using α = 0.9 as it yields the best results. Then, we apply their co-clustering techniques performing TS on clusters of correlated attackers and victims (TS-CA), and, finally, implement their full scheme by combining k-NN to cluster victims based on their similarity with CA and TS (TS-CA-k-NN). Figure 2 illustrates the improvement/increase in TP, FP, FN (compared to the TS baseline) as well as TPR, PPV, and F1, with various k values (ranging from 1 to 35) used by the k-NN algorithm to discover similar organizations. Obviously the k-NN parameter k does not affect TS-CA and TS. Figure 2 (a) shows that, with TS-CA-k-NN, the number of TP improve significantly as k increases, almost doubling the "hit count" compared to the TS baseline, whereas, TS-CA improves less (0.67). On the other hand, however, FP increase too, 5-to 50-fold, as clusters become bigger ( Figure 2(b) ), and naturally, this stark increase in FP leads to low precision, as shown in Figure 2 
PRIVACY-PRESERVING HIGHLY PRE-DICTIVE BLACKLISTING
Model
We set to support private computation of highly predictive blacklisting, so that organizations with limited mutual trust can collaborate and enhance the prediction of future attacks, while only the minimum amount of information is disclosed in the process. We assume the presence of a semi-trusted authority, namely STA, which acts as a coordinating entity between the organizations, but does not have access to data in the clear. In practice, STA could be run by DShield, or an ad-hoc cloud-based service, assisting organizations in the same sector (e.g., universities, banks, small businesses).
The STA performs clustering to identify organizations that are targeted by similar attackers, based on a pairwise similarity matrix, computed privately, which we denote as O2O (organization-toorganization). Once organizations have been assigned to clusters, they share information in a controlled way. Specifically, the system involves the following steps (detailed in Sections 5.1.1-5.1.4):
1. Organizations compute, privately, a pairwise similarity measure, used by STA to build an organization-to-organization matrix ("O2O"); 2. STA clusters organizations based on O2O; 3. Organizations share, in a privacy-preserving way, data with other organizations in their cluster; 4. Organizations perform the prediction based on their "enhanced" datasets.
Our system follows a data minimization approach whereby organizations in the clusters only share information about common and correlated attacks. We assume that STA is a semi-trusted authority that does not collude with any organization to violate privacy of other parties. We also assume that all the parties are semi-honest and follow the protocol specifications without modifying their inputs (see Appendix A for more details).
Organization-to-Organization Similarity
In order to cluster together organizations that are targeted by similar attackers, we use a similarity measure to be computed between each pair of organizations Oi, Oj (on input Di, Dj, respectively).
We consider a few approaches:
• The cardinality of the set intersection, |Di ∩ Dj|, i.e., the number of common attacks. Note that the intersection is between multi-sets, so if the same IP appears twice in both parties' logs in the same day, it is counted twice in the intersection; • Jaccard similarity index |Di ∩ Dj|/|Di ∪ Dj|;
• Cosine similarity, assuming datasets have size m:
• Pearson Correlation, assuming datasets have size m:
(dj k −dj) 2 wheredi,dj are the absolute means of Di, Dj.
We have evaluated the four approaches above experimentally and have observed that using cardinality of set intersection yields the best results overall in terms of precision and recall. Especially, Pearson Correlation and cosine similarity do not produce good overall performances (in terms of TPR and PPV). Therefore, to ease presentation, we only present results using the cardinality of set intersection as a pairwise similarity measure between organizations. Note that, to support private preserving computation of set intersection cardinality, we can use Private Set Intersection Cardinality (PSI-CA) [12] . In Section 6, we will introduce a server-aided variant reducing complexity by minimizing public-key operations, thus providing full scalability.
Clustering
The next step is for the STA authority to perform clustering based on the O2O matrix. For this task, we consider four clustering algorithms -namely, agglomerative clustering, k-means, k-NN, and DBSCAN -which use different approaches to discover groups of similar organizations. As discussed above, entries in the O2O matrix are similarity measures between two organizations, defined as the number of IP addresses attacking them both over a given time window. To ease presentation, we defer the review of the clustering algorithms to Appendix B.
Log Sharing
Next, STA reports to each organization the identity of other organizations in the same cluster (if any), so that they collaboratively (yet privately) share logs to boost the accuracy of their prediction. Below, we consider a few possible strategies to share information. Common Attacks (Intersection). Each organization in the cluster only shares logs corresponding to common attackers. Specifically, if an attacker is common for two organizations, these organizations share the events from their datasets related to this IP address. As a result, each entity enhances its local dataset with additional events about an attacker that have been witnessed by the rest of the contributors in its cluster, thus reinforcing the knowledge about that attacker. Privately sharing information about common attacks is possible via secure multiparty computation, using the Private Set Intersection with Data Transfer primitive (PSI-DT) [13] (reviewed in Appendix A). Section 6 shows how to rely on a server-aided variant to achieve scalability in the presence of many organizations.
Correlated Attacks (IP2IP). We also consider letting organizations in the same cluster identify correlations between attackers, by building a matrix of co-occurrences of attack sources. We aim to capture correlations between attackers that cannot be discovered based on the individual logs of each contributor, or using the common attacks approach discussed above. More specifically, a symmetric matrix -which we denote as IP2IP matrix -is built to store the number of co-occurrences for each pair of attackers, and a clustering algorithm such as k-NN is run to find correlated attacks.
To perform this task in an efficient and privacy-preserving way, we rely on the protocols proposed by Melis et al. [27] -also reviewed in Appendix A -for privacy-preserving Item-KNN using Count-Min sketches [9] . Each organization in a cluster encrypts and transmits a succinct representation of their matrix in such a way that STA can only decrypt the aggregate matrix. Despite an upper-bounded error in the aggregate is introduced due to the succinct data representation, the communication and computational overheads incurred by the cryptographic operations are reduced from linear to logarithmic in the size of the IP2IP matrix. Once the STA obtains the aggregate IP2IP matrix, it runs the Item-KNN algorithm, finds correlated attacks, and communicate them to organizations in the same cluster.
Common & Correlated Attacks (IP2IP+intersection). Obviously the two strategies discussed above can also be combined, so that cluster contributors can benefit from sharing their intersection (i.e., obtaining more events on attackers that already exist in their training set) as well as obtaining events from previously unseen attackers that have cluster-wide correlation.
Baseline (Local). We will also consider a baseline approach whereby each organization does not share any information with any other entity, i.e., making predictions based only on its local logs.
Sharing Everything (Global). We also measure a global approach whereby all contributors in the cluster share everything with each other. While we expect this approach to provide the highest degree of intelligence to the organizations, some of the information may be irrelevant to some contributors, yielding a high number of false positives/negatives. As we use this approach simply for comparison, we do not take into account privacy protection.
Attacks Prediction
In order to model the temporal dynamics of the attacks, we use a time series approach, namely Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA, cf. Section 3.2), as [37] showed that, for the large majority of attacking IP addresses, future activity strongly depends on the recent past. EWMA predicts future values based on past values weighted with exponentially decreasing weights towards older values. Specifically, for each organization u and for each attacker a on its training set, ra,u(t ) denotes a binary value indicating whether or not a attacked u at time t . EWMA aggregates these signals from the training set and outputs a measure of how likely a is going to attack u again. When collaboration takes place, the training set of each organization is augmented with logs and events coming from the entities in its cluster. Using this "enhanced" training set, the organization trains the EWMA algorithm and creates augmented blacklists. Once again, we set α = 0.9 as it yields the best results.
Comparing Strategies for Clustering and Log Sharing
We now present the results of our extensive experimental evaluation, comparing how different clustering (agglomerative, k-NN, k-means, DBSCAN) and sharing approaches (intersection, IP2IP, IP2IP+intersection) affect the performance of the predictive blacklisting, and compare to local (no sharing) and global (sharing everything) baselines. Our experiments are written in Python, using the scikit-learn machine learning suite [31] .
Note: Our main goal is to measure the effect of collaboration on the prediction, seeking to improve TP while keeping the increase in FP at a low, even though -as we discuss in Section 3.3 -we count FP in a somewhat conservative way. We are interested in comparing different clustering/sharing approaches with each other, as well as to the state-of-the-art non-private system by Soldo et al. [37] .
Settings. Throughout our experiments, we use notation and parameters introduced in Section 3, i.e., we consider 70 organizations using alerts collected from DShield in a 15-day period. Also, for the IP2IP method, we only consider the top-1000 attackers (i.e., the top-1000 heavy hitters) in each cluster, for each 5-day trainingset window, rather than looking for correlations over all the /24 IP space. Note that this is only done to speed up our experiments, whereas, we can actually use the Count-Min sketch based private aggregation protocols from [27] to efficiently support k-NN computation, privately, over all the 2 24 addresses. In fact, the succinct representation of the IP2IP matrix uses a sketch of size O(log(2 24 · 2 24 )): specifically, given parameters ( , δ), we get a matrix of size L = d × w where d = ln (2 24 · 2 24 )/(2 * δ) and w = e/ . Setting = δ = 0.01 [27] , the Count-Min sketch size amounts to L = 10, 336, yielding practical computational/communication overhead.
Finally, we fix the k value for the k-NN based recommendation to 50, as it provides the best results in our experiments.
Agglomerative Clustering
We consider different numbers of desired clusters (k), ranging from 1 to 35, setting affinity and linkage parameters to cosine and average, respectively, to indicate what distance measures to use between sets of observations. For k > 15, the size of the cluster slowly reaches 2 (see Appendix C for more details). As each organization is assigned to exactly one cluster, in each time window, all 70 organizations are involved in collaborations.
In Figures 3(a)-3(c) , we plot average T Pimpr, F Pincr, and F Nincr, respectively, with increasing number of clusters. Somewhat unsurprisingly, IP2IP achieves smaller T Pimpr results (at most 0.20) than global (up to 1.10), which however incurs higher F Nincr (0.3) and above all F Pincr (1000). We also note that T Pimpr presents a relatively large standard deviation for all cluster sizes, indicating that there are a few organizations that benefit from collaboration much more than others. From Figure 3 (e), observe that local yields the best performances in terms of precision (0.16), followed by intersection (0.15, slightly growing for larger k), while IP2IP and IP2IP+intersection slowly increase up to 0.13. Global performs poorly overall (up to 0.04) due to high FP. Finally, Figure 3 
k-means
Next, we use k-means (with O2O as the dataset of feature vectors) for clustering and obtain results similar to agglomerative clustering. Thus, we decide to restrict to stronger correlations, by only taking into account organizations closer to the cluster's centroid, and excluding the rest of them as outliers. We set a distance threshold and experiment with it empirically, finding that the optimal setting is the 40th percentile, i.e., the cluster distance value below which 40% of the organizations can be found. With growing values of k (ranging from 1 to 35), the algorithm produces more and smaller clusters, and more organizations collaborate (see App. C).
Figures 4(a)-4(c) plot the average improvement in TP and increase in FP and FN, respectively. T Pimpr is somewhat constant with IP2IP (0. 
k-NN
Recall that, in k-NN, the parameter k indicates the number of nearest neighbors that each entity considers as its most similar ones. Thus, organizations can end up in more than one neighborhood (unlike agglomerative clustering or k-means). Since the algorithm builds a neighborhood for each organization, not all clusters have the same strength. Therefore, we only consider strong clusters in terms of their members similarity and as done with k-means, after tuning the parameters, we set a distance threshold as the 40th percentile to leave possible outliers out of the clusters.
As k increases, so do cluster sizes, ranging from 1 to 14, and the algorithm builds on average 25 strong clusters in each time window. Note that for k = 1 all organizations are involved in exactly one cluster of size 1, since k-NN identifies them as their own nearest neighbor. Other than this special case, as we focus on strong clusters and set a distance threshold, the system makes fewer organizations collaborate overall (ranging from 220 with k = 5 to 320 with k = 35). See Appendix C for cluster sizes and the number of collaborators involved.
From Figure 5 (a), we observe that IP2IP+intersection yields the second best performance in T Pimpr (0.38, with k = 35), while global peaks at 0.60. Interestingly, the standard deviation of T Pimpr is much smaller than with other clustering algorithms, indicating that, due to overlapping clusters, "big" contributors can help a lot "smaller" ones, as they are involved in multiple clusters, thus, improvements are more uniformly distributed over the contributors that are involved in collaboration. In terms of F Pincr, IP2IP doubles the number of FP (for k = 35), while intersection achieves the lowest value with 0.51 (again, for k = 35). As with previous clustering algorithms, we notice that intersection yields the best decrease in FN, i.e., −0.5 with k = 35.
Intersection also achieves the highest TPR (up to 0.77) with larger cluster sizes (i.e., for k ≥ 10), while its combination with the IP2IP reduces it (0.71) -see Figure 5 (d). 
DBSCAN
Our last set of experiments are with DBSCAN: unlike the other clustering algorithms, this does not take the number of clusters as an input parameter, but relies on a threshold, eps, to define the maximum distance such that two samples are considered to be in the same neighborhood. For each time window, after tuning the parameter eps, the algorithm produces between 1 and 3 clusters.
As the total number of collaborators range from 50 to 210 (out of the total 700), we conclude that the algorithm identifies a lot of outliers, i.e., organizations that are left out of the clusters, and results in the setting that involves the least collaborators. Looking at Figure 6 (a), we observe that the best T Pimpr is produced when the algorithm builds 2 clusters. In this case, IP2IP+intersection achieves, on average, up to 0.70 T Pimpr but with a relatively high F Pincr (5.86). We also look at (but do not plot) the T Pimpr for every organization and notice that, with 2 clusters, there is one organization that improves dramatically more, while this does not happen when the algorithm builds 1 or 3 clusters. This fact highlights how, in certain settings, the benefits of collaboration are not so well distributed. Moreover, in 
Discussion
We now analyze the results of our experimental analysis and highlight a few interesting observations. Summary of Results. We summarize the best results for each clustering algorithm, in terms of F1, recall, precision, and T Pimpr respectively, in Tables 2-5. Note that intersection is that sharing mechanism that maximizes all metrics, except for T Pimpr, which is instead maximized with IP2IP+intersection.
We observe that DBSCAN always yields the best performance, in terms of F1 (0.36), however, with one single cluster of 33 contributors, thus, only a relatively small fraction of organizations (4%) benefit from collaboration. Whereas, agglomerative clustering involves all 700 contributors and achieves F 1 = 0.27. Both kmeans and k-NN yield 0.30 in F1 including, respectively, 280 and 240 collaborators. Similarly, DBSCAN with one cluster yields the best results for TPR (0.84) and PPV (0.23) as shown in Tables 3-4 . However, other collaboration settings include many more organizations with comparable results, e.g., k-NN with k = 35 and 320 collaborators achieves only 7% lower TPR (0.77), while k-means with k = 15 and 280 collaborators yields a 0.19 in PPV. In terms of T Pimpr, DBSCAN reaches a maximum of 0.74 when it builds 2 clusters of size 21.1 on average, selecting 210 collaborators overall. Once again, slightly lower improvements are achieved with other clustering algorithms, but with more collaborators benefiting from sharing, as well as fewer FP.
Data sharing always helps organizations forecast attacks, compared to performing predictions locally. Predicting based on all data from collaborators yields the highest improvement in T Pimpr -especially for bigger clusters -but with a dramatic increase in F Pincr. When organizations share correlated attacks (IP2IP), we observe a steady T Pimpr, while sharing common attacks (intersection) outperforms the former when bigger clusters are formed. However, intersection introduces lower F Pincr, ultimately leading to better precision and F1 measures. IP2IP+intersection always outperforms the two separate methods in terms of T Pimpr, thus, it is the recommended strategy if one only wants to maximize the number of predicted attacks -see Table 5 . Impact of cluster size. With agglomerative clustering, each organization is assigned to exactly one cluster and thus participates in/benefits from collaboration. We observe higher TPR for bigger clusters and, generally, a stable improvement in TP is achieved on average. Similar results are obtained with k-means when all organizations are assigned to clusters. However, when we set a distance threshold, creating more consistent clusters, we observe fluctuations in TPR: as clusters get smaller much faster (in relation to k value), IP2IP starts outperforming intersection. This indicates that correlated attacks can improve knowledge of organizations and enhance their local predictions, especially in smaller clusters.
With k-NN, a different behavior is observed: for smaller clusters, IP2IP achieves higher TPR (up to 0.7 for k = 5) but, as clusters get bigger, intersection yields the best results (up to 0.77 for k = 35). Then, as DBSCAN only builds large clusters, we observe fluctuations in TPR: for instance, intersection achieves 0.84 with one cluster, decreases to 0.77 with two clusters, and it increases again to 0.81 with three clusters. However, this fluctuation is not reflected by the T Pimpr -in fact, with two clusters, we actually obtain the best improvement (0.74 for IP2IP+intersection), likely due to the way organizations are split into clusters, rather than F Nincr (which is steady and independent as shown in Figure 6(c) ).
Overall, collaborating in big clusters leads to high T Pimpr but at the same time it introduces significant F Pincr. Increase/Improvement in TP/FP/FN. Table 5 shows that for all clustering algorithms, maximizing T Pimpr always leads to higher F Pincr, from 1.51 of k-NN up to 5.86 of DBSCAN. The settings that maximize the F1 measure, TPR, and PPV, (when sharing intersection) also minimize F Nincr, e.g. agglomerative with k = 1 achieves −0.53 F Nincr. We also report the standard deviation of T Pimpr and F Pincr, which provide an indication of the differences, in terms of "symmetry", of the benefits of collaborationi.e., higher standard deviation shows that some organizations improve TP or increase FP much more than others. In general, we observe that (privacy-friendly) collaboration does yield a remarkable increase in TP but also in FP, which results in a limited improvement in accuracy (F1 measure) compared to predicting using local logs only. However, as discussed earlier, note that we count FP in a conservative way and that our main goal is really to measure the effect of different collaboration strategies on the prediction (as well as comparing to Soldo et al. [37] ), seeking to improve TP while keeping the increase in FP as low as possible.
Comparison with [37] . When comparing to Soldo et al. [37] (cf. Section 4), we observe that they achieve a higher maximum T Pimpr (0.74 with DBSCAN, k = 2 vs 0.95), however, our privacy-preserving techniques outperform [37] in terms of recall (TPR) (e.g., with DBSCAN we reach 0.84 and with k-means 0.73, compared to their 0.66, i.e. up to 18% increase) as well as precision (0.23 with DBSCAN, k = 1 vs 0.08, i.e. up to 15% increase) and F1 measure (0.36 with DBSCAN, k = 1 vs 0.14). Note that, even if we consider settings involving more collaborators compared to DBSCAN, we still obtain appreciably better scores -e.g. agglomerative with k = 15 and 700 collaborators achieves F 1 = 0.27, and k-means with 280 collaborators 0.30.
IMPLEMENTING AT SCALE
As discussed above, our system involves four steps: (1) secure computation of pairwise similarity, (2) clustering, (3) secure data sharing within the clusters, and (4) time-series prediction. To assess its scalability, we need to evaluate computation and communication complexities incurred by each step. Naturally, (1) and (3) dominate complexities as they require running a number of cryptographic protocols (involving public-key crypto) that depends on the number of organizations involved. In fact, clustering incurs a negligible overhead: on commodity hardware, to perform clustering with 1,000 organizations, it takes 6.1ms for k-means, 81ms for agglomerative and 5.2ms for k-NN (k = 2), and 6.3ms for DB-SCAN (eps = 0.2). Also, time-series EWMA prediction requires 4.6µs per IP, so it takes 4.6ms for 1,000 IPs.
As we compute pairwise similarity based on the amount of common attacks between two organizations, and support its secure computation via PSI-CA [12] , step (1) requires a number of protocol runs quadratic in the number of organizations. In our experiments (see details below), it takes 1.98s and 2.12MB bandwidth for one protocol execution, using 2048-bit moduli, with sets of size 4,000 (the average number of attacks observed by each organization). As for (3), i.e., secure within-cluster sharing of events related to common attacks (intersection), we rely on PSI-DT [13] , and it takes 1.24s and 2.18MB for a single execution with the same settings. Therefore, complexities may quickly become prohibitive when more organizations are involved or more alerts are used.
Aiming to improve scalability, we introduce a variant supporting secure computation of pairwise similarity as well as secure log sharing without a quadratic number of public-key operations/quadratic communication overhead. Recall that we rely on a semi-trusted authority, STA, for clustering and coordination, which is assumed to follow protocol specifications and not to collude with other organizations, thus, we can actually use it to also help with secure computations. Inspired by Kamara et al.'s server-aided PSI [21] (see Appendix A), we extend our framework by replacing public-key cryptography operations with pseudo-random permutations (PRP), which we instantiate using AES. Specifically, we minimize interactions among pairs of organizations so that the complexity incurred by each of them is constant, while only imposing a minimal, linear communication overhead on STA.
Our extension involves four phases: (1) setup, where, as in [21] , one organization generates a random key κ and sends it to the other organizations, (2) encryption (Algorithm 1), where each organization Oi evaluates the PRP on each entry dj in their sets and encrypts the associated timestamp timej, (3) O2O computation (Algorithm 2), where STA computes the magnitude of common attacks between each pair of organizations in order to perform clustering, ·] entries to organizations in the same cluster
and (4) log sharing (Algorithm 3), where organizations in the same cluster C * receive information about common attacks (S i -s). Note that building the O2O matrix is actually optimized using hash tables (i.e., dense_hash_set and dense_hash_map from Sparehash [19] ). Also, since sets in our system are multi-sets, we concatenate counters to the IP address, so that the STA cannot tell which and how many IPs appear more than once.
A shortcoming of the PRP-based scheme is that if the STA colludes with an organization, it can decrypt data of all organizations. Whereas, using traditional PSI-CA/PSI-DT, collusion only leads to recovering a subset of datasets. Moreover, STA now also learns the size of each organization's dataset, although organizations could pad their sets by adding random entries, up to a fixed size.
Experimental Evaluation. To fully grasp the scalability of the server-aided extension, and compare it to using "traditional" PSI-CA and PSI-DT, we report execution times for increasing number of participating organizations. We benchmark the performance of PSI-CA [13] and PSI-DT [13] using 2048-bit moduli, modifying the OpenSSL/GMP-based C implementation in [14] , as well as the PRP-based scheme presented above and inspired by Kamara et al.'s work [21] . Experiments are run using two 2.3GHz Intel Core i5 CPUs with 8GB of RAM connected via a 100Mbps Ethernet link.
Figures 7(a) and 7(b) plot computation and communication complexities incurred by an individual organization vis-à-vis the total number of organizations involved in the system, while Figure 7 (c) reports the communication overhead introduced on the STA-side for the PRP scheme. Observe that complexities for PSI-CA/PSI-DT protocols on each organization grow linearly in the number of organizations (hence, quadratic overall). For instance, if 1,000 organizations are involved, it would take about 16 minutes per organization, each transmitting 1GB. Whereas, the PRP-based scheme incurs constant complexities on each organization (57.6ms and 120KB) and an appreciably low communication overhead on the STA (about 100MB) for 1,000 organizations.
IP2IP.
We also evaluate the IP2IP method whereby organizations interact with STA in order to discover cluster-wide correlated attacks. Assuming clusters of 100 organizations and an IP2IP matrix of (2 24 · 2 24 )/2 (recall from Section 5.2 that we consider the whole /24 IP space), we measure a 2.7s running time per organization with 41KB of bandwidth as well as a 0.07s overhead on the STA with 4.1MB bandwidth. Recall that we use the private Count-Min sketch based implementation by Melis et al. [27] , which results in the private aggregation of 10,336 elements. Note that, even if clusters are bigger than 100, as detailed in [27] , one can still perform private aggregation on multiple subgroups (e.g., of size 100) without endangering organizations' privacy. Security. Our system does not leak any information about the logs of each organization to the STA, with or without using the serveraided variant. Clustering is performed over similarity measures computed obliviously to STA, and so does within-cluster data sharing. Privacy-preserving computation occurs by using existing secure protocols such as PSI-CA/PSI-DT by De Cristofaro et al. [13, 12] ), server-aided PSI by Kamara et al. [21] , as well as private recommendation via succinct sketches by Melis et al. [27] . Therefore, we do not provide any additional proofs in the paper as the security of our techniques straightforwardly relies on that of these protocols.
CONCLUSION
This paper presented a scalable privacy-friendly system geared to build highly predictive blacklists. A semi-trusted authority clusters organizations based on the similarity of their attack logs, without receiving logs in the clear. Entities in the same cluster then share, again in a privacy-preserving way, relevant logs with each other, and build more accurate predictive blacklists. We present a comprehensive set of measurements as we experiment with prior work as well as with four different clustering algorithms and three privacy-preserving sharing strategies, using real-world alerts collected from DShield.org. Our results show that previously proposed (non privacy-preserving) centralized algorithms [37] introduce a large number of false positives and false negatives, thus resulting in poor accuracy (a fact which was overlooked in prior work), and that our privacy-friendly techniques markedly outperform them.
In future work, we will experiment with other prediction algorithms and evaluate similar strategies to different collaborative security problems, such as spam filtering and malware detection.
Special purpose protocols for PSI-DT have been proposed [16, 13] , but we do not know of any available garbled circuits based instantiation. Hence, we use the PSI-DT protocol described in [13] , secure in the Random Oracle Model under the One-More RSA assumption in the presence of semi-honest adversaries. It incurs communication and computational complexities linear in the size of the sets: parties need to exchange O(v + w) group items, and compute O(w) RSA-CRT exponentiations and O(v) modular multiplications if one picks a small RSA public exponent (e.g., 3 or 17).
Once again, in the semi-honest model, two executions of PSI-DT with inverted roles trivially yield a mutual PSI-DT where both parties learn the intersection.
Server-aided PSI [21] . In [21] , Kamara et al. propose a serveraided PSI relying on a semi-honest server: during a setup phase, parties {P1, . . . , Pn} jointly generate a secret key κ for a pseudorandom permutation (PRP). Each party Pi then randomly permutes their set Si, by computing PRPκ(Si), and sends the result to the server. This then computes the intersection of the labels PRPκ(Si), i = 1, . . . , n and returns it to all the parties. Finally, each Pi outputs the inverse of PRP() over the intersection of the labels. The protocol is secure in the presence of a semi-honest server and honest parties, or a honest server and any collusion of malicious parties, if the PRP is secure.
Efficient Private Recommendation via Succinct Sketches [27] . A privacy-friendly recommender system based on Item-KNN [35] has been introduced by Melis et al. [27] . Their construction involves a "tally" server (the BBC in their application example) and a set of users (visitors of BBC's broadcasting site iPlayer). The main goal of their system is to train the recommender system using only aggregate statistics. Specifically, they build a global matrix of co-views (i.e., pairs of programs watched by the same user) in a privacy-preserving way, by relying on (i) private data aggregation based on secret sharing (inspired by [24] ), and (ii) Count-Min sketches [9] to reduce the computation/communication overhead from linear to logarithmic in the size of the matrix, trading off an upper-bounded error with increased efficiency.
If M denotes the number of items (e.g., the programs on iPlayer in their application, or the number of IP addresses in ours), the compact representation of the IP2IP through the Count-Min Sketch has size O(log(M * M/2)). More precisely, given parameters ( , δ), the Count-Min Sketch is a matrix of size L = d × w where d = ln (M * M )/(2 * δ) and w = e/ . Melis et al. [27] set = δ = 0.01, yielding, e.g., L = 4, 896 for M = 1, 000, and L = 10, 336 for M = 2 24 . The parameters ( , δ) give an upper bounded error for the estimated countersĉi amounting toĉi ≤ ci + j |cj| with probability 1−δ, where ci is the true element. As demonstrated empirically by Melis et al. [27] , the error ultimately introduces a negligible impact on the accuracy of the aggregation as well as the recommendation. Finally, the computational overhead introduced by the cryptographic operations for private aggregation, as demonstrated experimentally in [27] , are in the order of seconds even with thousands of items.
B. CLUSTERING ALGORITHMS
Agglomerative Clustering. Hierarchical Clustering algorithms build nested clusters by merging or splitting them successively. The hierarchy is represented as a tree, with the root being the unique cluster that gathers all the samples, and the leaves the clusters with only one sample. Agglomerative clustering performs hierarchical clustering using a bottom-up approach: each observation starts in its own cluster, and clusters are successively merged together. Different linkage criteria determine the actual metric used to merge, e.g., average linkage minimizes the average of the distances between all observations of pairs of clusters, while complete linkage minimizes the maximum distance between the observations of pairs of clusters. k-means. k-means clustering separates samples in groups of equal variance, minimizing inertia or within-cluster sum of squares. The k-means algorithm requires the number of clusters to be specified as it divides a set of N samples X into k disjoint clusters C, each described by the mean µj of the samples in the cluster. The means are commonly called the cluster "centroids" and the algorithm chooses centroids that minimize n i=0 minµ j ∈C (||xj − µi|| 2 ). The algorithm includes three steps: (1) choosing the initial centroids, often by choosing k samples from X; (2) assigning each sample to its nearest centroid; and (3) creating new centroids by taking the mean value of all samples assigned to each previous centroid. The algorithm loops between (2) and (3) until the difference between the old and the new centroids is below a threshold. k-Nearest Neighbors (k-NN). k-NN is a simple machine learning algorithm that finds a predefined number of training samples closest in distance to a new sample. The number of samples can be a user-defined constant and the distance can be any metric measure: standard Euclidean distance is the most common choice. In Section 5, we employ unsupervised k-NN to identify, for each organization, its most similar ones. DBSCAN. Density-based spatial clustering of applications with noise (DBSCAN), given a set of points in some space, groups together points that are closely packed together (points with many nearby neighbors), marking as outliers points that lie alone in low density regions. The central component to DBSCAN are core samples, i.e., samples in areas of high density. A cluster is a set of core samples, each close to each other (measured by some distance measure) and a set of non-core samples that are close to a core sample (but are not themselves core samples). There are two parameters of the algorithm, min_samples and eps, defining density. Higher min_samples or lower eps indicate higher density necessary to form a cluster. In other words, a core sample is defined such that there exist min_samples other samples within a distance of eps. A cluster is a set of core samples, and can be built by recursively taking a core sample, finding all of its neighbors that are core samples, and so on. Figure 8 reports the average size of the clusters as well as the total number of collaborators involved in them with each clustering algorithm and various k values, as discussed in Section 5.2. Agglomerative clustering assigns all organizations to clusters (700 collaborators in total) with the average cluster size decreasing as k increases. When setting a cluster distance threshold, k-means yields a linear increase in the total number of collaborators up to 480 (k = 35) and the average cluster size decreases faster than agglomerative, in relation to k. k-NN with strong clusters involves between 220 and 320 collaborators and the average cluster size grows linearly in k (cluster sizes range from 1 to 14). Finally, for DBSCAN, the total number of collaborators peaks at 210 when it builds two clusters of average size 21.1. 
C. CLUSTER SIZES
